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ABSTRACT: The time-honored view that logic is a non-empirical enterprise is still widely accepted, but it is not always 
recognized that there are (at least) two distinct ways in which this view can be made precise. One way fo-
cuses on the knowledge we can have of logical matters, the other on the nature of the logical consequence 
relation itself. More specifically, the first way embodies the claim that knowledge of whether the logical 
consequence relation holds in a particular case is knowledge that can be had a priori (if at all). The second 
way presupposes a distinction between structural and non-structural properties and relations, and it holds 
that logical consequence is to be defined exclusively in terms of the former. It is shown that the two ways 
are not coextensive by giving an example of a logic that is non-empirical in the second way but not in the 
first.  
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In “Logical Consequence and Logical Expressions” (2003) Mario Gómez-Torrente 
discusses many central issues in the philosophy of logic in an elegant, knowledgeable, 
and sensible manner. At the beginning of his paper Gómez-Torrente notes the impor-
tance of form and modality for the notion of logical consequence, and he asserts that 
a necessary condition for the conclusion of an argument to follow from the premises 
is that it “follows by logical necessity from those premises”. He further asserts that this notion 
of following by logical necessity is “associated (in ways which are themselves unclear 
and vague) to unclear and vague notions like analytical implication, a priori implication 
and implication by necessity (tout court)”. I agree that these notions and the connec-
tions between them, while important for logic, are nevertheless unclear and vague. Yet 
I think it is possible to make some headway in understanding them and the ways in 
which they are interrelated. Elsewhere I have discussed the first and the third of the 
notions Gómez-Torrente mentions. In the present paper I concentrate largely on is-
sues related to the second1.  
 The suggestion that something called ‘a priori implication’ is part of the notion of 
following by logical necessity, and hence part of the notion of logical consequence it-
self, carries with it the suggestion that logic is fundamentally a non-empirical enter-
prise. I agree with Gómez-Torrente that this is indeed the case and that the competing 
view, the view that logic is in some sense empirical, is mistaken2. But the mere claim 
that logic is not empirical is itself unclear and vague. I suggest that a good way to be-
gin improving our understanding of this claim is to reflect on a familiar passage from 
Tarski’s classic paper on logical consequence. In (1936, 414-15) Tarski says:  
Certain considerations of an intuitive nature will form our starting-point. Consider any class K of sentences 
and a sentence X which follows from the sentences of this class. From an intuitive standpoint it can never 
                                                   
1  See my (2002b) for a discussion of the connections between analytic implication, necessity tout court, 
and logical consequence.  I have previously discussed a priori implication in (1997) and (2002a).  Some 
of the points made in the present paper are also made in (2002a) in the course of clarifying the posi-
tion I took in (1997) and rebutting criticisms of it made by Sher (2001).   
2  Such a view was held by John Stuart Mill.  A more recent, and much discussed, version of this view can 
be found in Putnam (1968).   
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happen that both the class K consists only of true sentences and the sentence X is false. Moreover, since we 
are concerned here with the concept of logical, i.e., formal, consequence, and thus with a relation which is to 
be uniquely determined by the form of the sentences between which it holds, this relation cannot be influ-
enced in any way by empirical knowledge, and in particular by knowledge of the objects to which the sen-
tence X or the sentences of the class K refer. The consequence relation cannot be affected by replacing the 
designations of the objects referred to in these sentences by the designations of any other objects.  
 The last part of the penultimate sentence is particularly germane to the present in-
vestigation: “[the logical consequence] relation cannot be influenced in any way by 
empirical knowledge, and in particular by knowledge of the objects to which the sentence 
X or the sentences of the class K refer” (emphasis added). Although this is somewhat 
obscure, one reading of it, for which I have argued elsewhere (1997, 2002a), is the fol-
lowing: 
Logic is Not Empirical, Sense 1 (LNE1): Knowledge of whether the logical conse-
quence relation holds in any particular case is knowledge that can be had a 
priori, if at all.  
LNE1 is not just a criterion that can with some plausibility be extracted from Tarski’s 
paper on logical consequence; it also reflects a view that has been widely held for a 
long time. Logic has long been held to be free, in some fundamental way, of all things 
empirical, and I believe many logicians have thought that logic achieves this freedom 
by satisfying LNE1 (or a similar standard). Thus I suggest that LNE1 embodies a 
plausible way of understanding Gómez-Torrente’s a priori implication.  
 Still LNE1 is not the only criterion that can be extracted, with some plausibility, 
from the passage recently quoted from Tarski. Consider again a (slightly larger) part of 
that passage, but this time with different emphasis: “[the logical consequence] relation 
cannot be influenced in any way by empirical knowledge, and in particular by knowl-
edge of the objects to which the sentence X or the sentences of the class K refer. The 
consequence relation cannot be affected by replacing the designations of the objects re-
ferred to in these sentences by the designations of any other objects” (emphasis added). 
This reading suggests a different way for logic to be free of matters empirical, one that 
has been championed by a number of philosophers of logic, including Gila Sher 
(1991, 1996, 2001). Sher holds that “objects and systems of objects have, in addition 
to physical, biological, sociological, and many other kinds of properties, also formal or 
structural properties”, and that it is “the task of logic … to construct a theory of the 
transmission (preservation) of truth based on formal or structural grounds” (2001, 
245-46). This formal-structural approach, as Sher calls it, thus requires “the indiffer-
ence of logical consequence to empirical properties of individuals in a given universe” 
(2001, 258) 3.  
 I think it can be plausibly argued that taking indifference to empirical properties as 
a desideratum for logic is supported by the last two sentences in the passage recently 
quoted from Tarski. In (2002a) I expressed this view of logic as follows:  
 
                                                   
3  For details on the formal-structural approach see Sher (1991, 1996).  Sher’s account is based on work 
by Lindstrom (1969, 1974) that extends Mostowski’s (1957) idea of cardinality quantifiers.  It is simi-
lar to the view advocated by Tarski in (1986).   
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Logic is Not Empirical, Sense 2 (LNE2): The logical consequence relation is de-
fined exclusively in terms of the formal properties of (and formal relations 
among) objects. Logic is blind to empirical, nonstructural properties and re-
lations4.  
LNE2 is a way for logic to be free of the empirical that is very different than LNE1, 
but the latter is more plausible as an explication of Gómez-Torrente’s a priori implica-
tion than the former. This is because LNE1 deals directly with the knowledge we can 
have of the logical consequence relation, and it sets a specific criterion of apriority for 
that knowledge. LNE2, on the other hand, deals with two different kinds of proper-
ties and relations of things, those that are empirical (e.g., physical, biological, socio-
logical), and those that are formal or structural, and it has no obvious connection with 
a priori knowledge.  
 I suppose it might be suggested that these latter kinds of properties and relations, 
being in some sense the farthest removed from direct experience, could be labeled ‘a 
priori’, and that an account of logical consequence satisfying LNE2 could thus be said 
to exhibit a priori implication. But this seems like an unacceptable distortion of the 
meaning of the widely used, though vague, philosophical term ‘a priori’. So I prefer to 
understand a priori implication as a kind of implication that satisfies LNE1.  
 There are thus (at least) two distinct ways in which it might be claimed that the 
logical consequence relation is free of the empirical. One claim would be that logical 
consequence, properly understood, incorporates a priori implication by satisfying 
LNE1, the other that it satisfies LNE2 and thus embodies Sher’s formal-structural 
approach. It is significant, moreover, that the difference between LNE1 and LNE2 is 
not just one of sense, it is also one of reference. For it can be proved that LNE1 and 
LNE2 are not coextensive. The proof is contained in the following paragraphs, which 
begin with an account of the formal-structural approach.  
 In (1991, 1996) Sher develops the formal-structural view of logical consequence 
(hereafter FS ) as a generalization of standard first-order logic that specifies precisely 
what it is for a term to be logical. The core idea is that a logical term is either a senten-
tial connective that refers (rigidly, on Sher’s preferred account) to a truth-functional 
operator or a term that refers (rigidly) to an operator that is formal in the sense of be-
ing “indifferent to all 1-1 replacements of individuals, both within and across uni-
verses”, as she puts it in (2001, 247) 5. Call this criterion of logicality the FS criterion. 
Examples of terms that satisfy the FS criterion are the usual logical constants of first-
order logic (e.g., ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if-then’, in their truth-functional senses, the binary 
                                                   
4  Sher’s contrastive use the terms ‘empirical’ and ‘structural’ strongly suggests that for her the terms ‘em-
pirical property’ and ‘nonstructural property’ are coextensive.  My use of the latter two terms also as-
sumes this coextensiveness.  Of course this entire approach assumes that a sharp distinction can be 
drawn between structural and nonstructural properties, but we shall see that this can indeed be done.   
5  For a complete presentation of Sher’s account of formal operators see (1991, especially 54-56) or (2001, 
section 1).  A similar, yet significantly different, account of logical terms (one based on invariance 
over homomorphic rather than isomorphic structures) is presented and discussed by Feferman 
(1999).   
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predicate ‘is identical with’, the quantifiers ‘some’, and ‘all’), and the quantifiers 
‘finitely many’, ‘uncountably many’, ‘most’, and ‘as many as not’.  
 The FS criterion classifies as logical many terms that are not ordinarily so classified, 
and the FS approach declares that it is appropriate to treat any such term as a logical 
term in the formal development of a logic. Let’s call a language and its accompanying 
semantics (including the definitions of such basic logical notions as logical truth and 
logical consequence) an FS logic if it treats only terms satisfying the FS criterion as 
logical. So standard first-order logic is an FS logic, but there are many other FS logics 
as well. The FS approach is thus applicable to many different languages, subject only 
to the constraint on logical terms imposed by the FS criterion.  
 Aside from treating as logical many terms that are not ordinarily so treated, the 
semantics of FS logics is otherwise quite standard. It is based on models in the sense 
now common in logic, a model consisting of a nonempty set D (the domain) and a 
function F (the assignment function) that assigns to each nonlogical term of a speci-
fied language an element of D or a set-theoretic construct of elements of D. Truth in 
a model for a given FS logic is defined by means of a recursive definition that contains 
a clause for each logical term of the language. Finally, the definitions of validity (logical 
truth), consistency, and logical consequence are the familiar ones of standard model-theoretic 
semantics.  
 It is not difficult to show that there are FS logics (i.e., logics that satisfy LNE2) 
that violate LNE1. This is because there are FS logics containing arguments we can 
know to be valid or invalid a posteriori but not a priori. As an example consider an FS 
logic that contains all the usual logical constants of first-order logic plus the quantifier 
‘Q*’, which is defined as behaving exactly like ‘all’ in models with domains of cardinal-
ity ³ n, but like ‘at least one’ in models with domains of cardinality < n, where the 
value of n is an integer we can know a posteriori but not a priori6. To make matters 
more specific, we can take n (as I did in (1997)) to be the least number of whole sec-
onds in which, up through the end of the twenty-first century, a human runs a mile. 
Now consider the following argument: 
 




                                                   
6  I take quantifiers to be linguistic expressions, such as ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘"’, ‘$’ (the latter two being read ‘all’, 
and ‘some’) that designate certain operators.  In order to satisfy Sher’s criterion for being a logical 
constant, the quantifier ‘Q*’ must be understood as an expression that rigidly designates the operator 
described in the text.  This can be accomplished by reading ‘Q*’ as something like ‘All, if the number 
of individuals ³ dthat(n), otherwise at least one’, where ‘dthat’ is the rigidifying functor of Kaplan 
(1979).  (Compare ‘Q*’ with Gómez-Torrente’s ‘$’, (2003 section 5).)   
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Since we know that n ³ 3, we know the argument is invalid, but we can’t know this a 
priori. Yet ‘Q*’ counts as a logical term according to FS, so FS violates LNE17, 8.  
 The foregoing example shows that LNE1 and LNE2 are not coextensive criteria, 
since there are logics that satisfy the latter but not the former. This should not be sur-
prising, since LNE2 sets a standard for the logical consequence relation itself, while 
LNE1 sets a standard for our knowledge of that relation. Yet these standards have 
sometimes been conflated, perhaps because each can be described, in general terms, as 
requiring that logic be non-empirical9. It is thus important to realize that this general 
requirement can be made precise in (at least) two different and demonstrably non-
coextensive ways. The argument containing ‘Q*’ given above is logically correct in one 
non-empirical sense of logical correctness (because it satisfies LNE2), but it is logically 
incorrect in another non-empirical sense of logical correctness (because it fails to sat-
isfy LNE1). There is of course no reason why the logical consequence relation could 
not be required to satisfy both LNE1 and LNE2, and one who is strongly committed 
to the non-empirical nature of logic may want to adopt such a position10.  
                                                   
7  To see that the operator expressed by ‘Q*’ satisfies Sher’s criterion for formal operators it is sufficient 
to see how that criterion applies to unary first-order quantifiers.  Under Sher’s account such quantifi-
ers are linguistic expressions that (rigidly) designate functions from models to subsets of the power 
set of a model’s domain.  (For example, the quantifier ‘at least one’ designates the function that takes 
each model to the set of all nonempty subsets of the domain of that model, the quantifier ‘all’ desig-
nates the function that takes a model to the unit set of its domain, the quantifier ‘finitely many’ desig-
nates the function that takes a model to the set of all finite subsets of its domain, etc.)  A quantified 
sentence is true in a model just in case the extension of the open sentence that results from deleting 
the quantifier is an element of the set that is the value of the function designated by the quantifier 
when that model is taken as argument.  Suppose now that M1 and M2 are (not necessarily distinct) 
models, A1 and A2 their domains, and B1 and B2 subsets of these domains, respectively.  Consider the 
structures <A1, B1> and <A2, B2>.  These structures are isomorphic if there is a one-one mapping 
from A1 onto A2 that is also one-one from B1 onto B2.  According to Sher’s criterion, the function 
designated by a quantifier is a formal operator if, for any such pair of models and isomorphic struc-
tures, B1 is an element of the value of the function (when M1 is taken as its argument) if and only if 
B2 is an element of the value of the function (when M2 is taken as its argument).   
   It is easy to see that the operators expressed by ‘all’, ‘at least one’, and ‘finitely many’ are formal in this 
sense.  It is also clear that the operator expressed by ‘Q*’ counts as a unary first-order quantifier and 
that it satisfies Sher’s formality criterion.  For, given any two models with domains of the same cardi-
nality, that operator functions either as the operator expressed by ‘all’ in both models or as the opera-
tor expressed by ‘at least one’ in both.  Hence the operator expressed by ‘Q*’ is formal for the same 
reasons these other two operators are.  (Notice that not all operators designated by quantifiers count 
as formal operators.  An example given by Sher (1991, 58) is the operator designated by the quantifier 
‘pebbles in the Red Sea’ (i.e., the function that assigns to each model the set of nonempty subsets of 
its domain that contain only pebbles from the Red Sea)).   
8  I objected to Sher’s FS approach in (1997, 2002a) because it violates LNE1.  It is worth noting that Fe-
ferman objects to it for a different reason.  He says:  “No natural explanation is given by it of what 
constitutes the same logical operation over arbitrary basic domains” (1999, 37, emphasis in the origi-
nal).  Presumably the fact that FS classifies terms like ‘Q*’ as logical is behind this remark.   
9  Indeed Sher’s conflation of LNE1 and LNE2 is responsible for much of her misunderstanding, ex-
pressed in (2001), of what I say in (1997) about FS.   
10  In connection with this point it is worth noting that in (2001) Sher withdraws her previous objection 
to LNE1 (and similar conditions), which she expressed forcefully in (1991, 64-65).  Specifically, she 
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 The foregoing discussion of FS and the difference between LNE1 and LNE2 is 
also relevant to Gómez-Torrente’s criticism, in section 5 of (2003), of attempts to give 
a precise characterization of the notion of a logical expression. Indeed what I am call-
ing ‘FS’ is essentially the same as the approach Gómez-Torrente there calls ‘the Tar-
skian characterization’11. Gómez-Torrente criticizes the Tarskian characterization be-
cause it “doesn’t satisfy the requirement of determining a set of expressions compati-
ble with the use (vague as it is) of ‘logical expression’.” Similarly, I criticized FS in 
(1997, 2002a) for failing to satisfy LNE1, because I believe that LNE1 (or a very simi-
lar apriority criterion) has been and continues to be a widely accepted part of the intui-
tive notion of logical consequence. But Gómez-Torrente makes a more general criti-
cism of attempts to draw a sharp distinction between logical and non-logical expres-
sions:  
These attempts usually characterize the notion of a logical expression (or of the logical expressions to be 
found in a restricted set of expressions) in terms of alleged semantic, epistemic or mathematical peculiarities 
of the logical expressions. I conjecture that these attempts will not succeed, since it must be nearly impossible 
to model closely the vague and pragmatic notion of a logical expression in those terms.  
 I believe that Gómez-Torrente is basically correct about this. Indeed I have argued 
in (1997) that in spite of attempts, of the kind he considers, to provide precise criteria 
for distinguishing logical from non-logical expressions, in the end we are forced to rely 
on vague pragmatic principles to make this distinction12.  
 In closing I’ll add only that I agree with many other points that Gómez-Torrente 
makes in (2003), including much of what he says in section 4 about the logical conse-
quence relation in higher-order languages. In particular I applaud his emphasis in sec-
tion 4 on the importance, for higher-order languages, of the first implication in his (2). 
The first implication in (2), which he expresses as  
 
ValT(K,X) Þ LC(K,X), 
 
is the claim that every argument that is valid in the precise model-theoretic sense that 
derives from Tarski exhibits the intuitive logical consequence relation. The fact that 
this implication can be proved for first-order languages but is open to question for 
higher-order languages (and indeed for any language, the logic of which lacks a sound 
and complete proof procedure) has not always received the attention it deserves in 
philosophical discussions of logical consequence13.  
 
                                                                                                                                 
says in (2001, 256) that adding a requirement to FS that would have the effect of making it satisfy 
LNE1 is a matter of personal preference to which she is indifferent.   
11  For details on the relations between FS, the Tarskian characterization, and Mostowski’s approach, see 
Gómez-Torrente (2002, especially 15, 18-19).   
12  Specifically, I argued in (1997, 375-379) that the choice of logical terms was a pragmatic one, subject 
only to the constraints that some terms be designated as logical, that some of these be ubiquitous 
(i.e., ones that appear in discourse on virtually every subject), and that the terms chosen, taken to-
gether, do not result in violation of LNE1.   
13  I have discussed this matter in (1997), (1999), and (2002a).   
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